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RECENT DECISIONS
Creditor's Rights: After-acquired Property-Questions of credi-
tors' priorities in bankruptcy actions have always raised interesting
and debatable issues. Understandably, each creditor feels he
should receive a part of the assets; however, situations arise in
which the claims are so large, and the assets so small, that the
creditor who is placed first will take all the assets.
For instance, which creditor will be first in priority in the fol-
lowing example? A is the record title holder of real estate. B mort-
gages A's property to C, then D dockets judgments against A. C
forecloses the mortgage on B and A quitclaims the property to B.
The answer, to those acquainted with priorities, is that D will stand
first in priority. The authority putting D first is grounded in statu-
tory and common law. First, Wisconsin Statutes section 270.79(1)
provides in part as follows:
(1) Every judgment, when properly docketed, and the docket
gives the judgment debtor's place of abode and his occupation,
trade or profession shall, for 10 years from the date of the entry
thereof, be a lien on the real property (except the homestead
mentioned in section 270.20) in the county were docketed, of
every person against whom it is rendered and docketed, which he
has at the time of docketing or which he acquires thereafter
within said 10 years. ....
The statute states that when the judgment is properly docketed
by D it attaches to the "real property" A owns at that time. Hence
D stands ahead in time as against C, the mortgagee, because the
property was not quitclaimed by A to B until after the judgment
was docketed.
Second, the common law rule of after-acquired property also
would apply, although Wisconsin has no authority for this posi-
tion. The doctrine of after-acquired property has long been recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court 2 and is neatly explained
in a federal court decision, Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co.:
I. Wis. STAT. § 270.79(1), construed in Mueller v. Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 43,
78 N.W.2d 881 (1956).
2. Pennock v. Coe, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 117, 129 (1859); Dunham v. Railway Co., 68
U.S. (I Wall.) 254, 266 (1863); Railroad Co. v. Cowdry, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 459,481 (1870);
Dillion v. Barnard, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 430 (1874); Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235, 251
(1878); Myer v. Car Co., 102 U.S. 1 (1880); Porter v. Steel Co., 122 U.S. 267, 283 (1886).
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. . . one may execute a mortgage, valid at least in equity, upon
property not in existence or not owned by him, the lien of which
will immediately attach to the property when it shall come into
existence, or become the property of the mortgagor, and this
whether the title of the mortgagee is legal or equitable.3
Therefore, the equitable lien possessed by C, the mortgagee, will
attach to A's property only after B actually acquires it. Since D
docketed his judgment before A quitclaimed the property to B, D
is first in priority. Indeed, the federal court bore out this reasoning
when it stated:
. . . the mortgagee of after-acquired property is not a purchaser
for value, and cannot acquire an interest by way of lien greater
than that which the mortgagor has himself acquired. The lien of
the mortgage attaches to after-acquired property in the condition
in which the mortgagor takes it from his vendor, and subject to
all known liens and equities valid against the vendor, and also
subject to all liens or equities valid against the vendee and mort-
gagor which arise in the act of purchase or acquisition.4
Hence, because C cannot possess an interest greater than that of
B, the mortgagor, C, takes the property in the same state as B
acquires it; that is, with D's judgment already attached. In conclu-
sion, then, there are principles placing D in the priority position
under both statutory and common law.
Without changing the time sequence or ownership set forth
above, only one fact will be altered for the second example. A will
become the sole shareholder and president of B, a corporation, the
mortgagor, who participates in the mortgage as president of the
firm. Does this change alter the priorities of D and C? The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court stated that C, the mortgagee, rather than D,
the judgment creditor, has priority in the case of I.F.C. Collateral
v. Commercial Units, Inc.5 The court stated that the general rule
in Wisconsin is:
One who obtains an equitable interest for value given, which later
ripens into a legal interest is entitled to priority over a judgment
creditor who dockets his judgment in the interim period.'
This meant that C, the mortgagee, obtains an equitable lien
3. 90 F. 322 (6th Cir. 1898).
4. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
5. 51 Wis. 2d 41, 186 N.W.2d 214 (1970).
6. Id. at 49, 186 N.W.2d at 217 (1970).
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from the mortgage transaction and because D docketed between
the mortgage date and the quitclaim date his lien attached second
in time to C's.
To illustrate how the doctrine applied to defeat the claim of the
judgment creditor, D, the court used an analogy between equitable
conversion in a land sales contract, and an equibable mortgage
situation, both occurring under the doctrine of relation back. In the
typical installment land sales contract, a seller contracts to deed
land to a buyer for a down payment and agreed upon installment
payments. The court cited the leading Wisconsin cases that applied
equitable conversion and relation back to a claim of a creditor who
docketed against the seller before the final payment. 7 The court
said the cases showed that at the time at which the contract be-
tween the buyer and the seller became enforceable, the buyer pos-
sessed the equitable title and the seller held the legal title in trust
as a security interest for the purchase price.' Furthermore, the
court explained, the doctrine of relation back operates on the con-
tract between the parties in such a way that when the purchaser
has made the last payment, the legal title vests in him as of the date
the contract was entered into.9 Hence the judgment creditor who
docketed against the seller after the contract was made, but before
its completion, had no real property in the seller to which the
judgment could attach. The court stated:
The contract, therefore, becomes the principal thing. The
completed transaction and every step in the transaction relates
back to the date of the contract, and it is of no significance, in
determining the interests of each party, that the full purchase
price has not been paid before docketing of the judgment, pro-
vided the contract itself is a valid binding agreement made be-
tween the parties before the docketing of the judgment."
The court categorized the instant case as an equitable mortgage
situation, which it defined arose
v . . when, for value received, one party attempted to convey a
security interest in his land to another and such attempt failed
because of some error or omission in the documents which pre-
7. Blaha v. Borgman, 142 Wis. 43, 124 N.W. 1047 (1910); Lewis v. Banking Comm.,
225 Wis. 606, 275 N.W. 429 (1932); G. OSBORNE, LAW OF MORTGAGES 326, 327 (2d ed.
1970); J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1054-1058 (5th ed. 1941).
8. Mueller v. Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 501, 78 N.W.2d 881 (1956).
9. Id. at 507, 78 N.W.2d at 883 (1956).
10. Id. at 505, 78 N.W.2d at 883 (1956).
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vented the transaction from being denominated a legal mort-
gage."
The court explained that the relation back applied here when
the error was corrected or the omission supplied.12 The correction
relates back in time to the attempted mortgage and makes it legal
as of the date of the original mortgage. 3 This doctrine, as in the
previous one of equitable conversion, may only be defeated by a
bona fide purchaser for value without notice.'4 The judgment credi-
tor in Wisconsin is not a bona fide purchaser without notice, be-
cause he has not parted with anything of value in reliance on the
state of the debtor's title. 5 Thus the court held that C, the mortga-
gee, was first in priority, instead of D, the judgment creditor,
because D had docketed after the mortgage date and therefore A's
quitclaim deed to his corporation, B, corrected the mistake and
triggered the doctrine of relation back. 6
The judgment creditor argued that the doctrines of equitable
conversion and equitable mortgage should not operate equally be-
cause in the land contract situation the purchaser held an equitable
title while the equitable mortgagee held only a security interest' 7
The court recognized the difference, however, and stated that:
. . . the controlling question in equity at least, is not how big the
prior interest is, but rather whether the holder of the prior inter-
est paid value for it, regardless oi its size.18
This of course means that both the land purchaser in the install-
ment land contract and the equitable mortgagee are bona fide
purchasers for value without notice.
Upon analyzing the principles of after-acquired property, and
the statutory language of Wisconsin Statute 270.79(1), as used in
the first example, along with the court's reasoning under the facts
I1. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1054 (5tn ed. 1941); G. OSBORNE, LAW OF
MORTGAGES § 31 (2d ed. 1970).
12. I.F.C. Collateral Corp. v. Commercial Units, Inc., 51 Wis. 2d 41, 49, 186 N.W.2d
214 (1970).
13. Id. at 49, 186 N.W.2d at 217 (1970).
14. Main v. Bosworth, 77 Wis. 51, 236 N.W. 585 (1931); I.F.C. Collateral Corp. v.
Commercial Units, Inc., 51 Wis. 2d 41, 49, 186 N.W.2d 214 (1970).
15. Stankiller v. Braves, 97 Wis. 515, 519, 73 N.W. 48 (1897); I.F.C. Collateral Corp.
v. Commercial Units, Inc., 51 Wis. 2d 41, 49, 186 N.W.2d 214, 217-18 (1970).
16. I.F.C. Collateral Corp. v. Commercial Units, Inc., 51 Wis. 2d 41, 52, 186 N.W.2d
214 (1970).
17. Id. at 52, 186 N.W.2d at 219 (1970).
18. Id. at 52, 186 N.W.2d at 219 (1970).
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of I.F.C. Collateral Corp. v. Commercial Units, Inc., several
points become important.
First, the court, by not denominating the property as after-
acquired, treated B, the corporation, as the owner throughout the
mortgage transaction. Second, this difference in ownership was
treated as an error or omission in the original mortgage so that A's
quitclaim deed to B after D had docketed his judgments against A
merely corrected the mistake and invoked the doctrine of relation
back. Third and finally, the court held the equitable mortgagee, C,
to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, even though
B did not have title to the property when mortgaged.
Objectively comparing these conclusions in turn with the facts
and results, it would seem that logic and equity would be on the
side of the United States Supreme Court.
First, it is difficult to argue that one lending the amount of
money that was lent here ($400,000,000), could or would allow
himself not to be absolutely sure of the state of the debtor's title.
It is equally difficult to argue that one who mortgages someone
else's property merely makes a mistake as to who is the owner.
Second, since A was the record owner of the property when D
docketed his judgment, that lien should have attached to all real
property A owned at that time, both under Wisconsin Statute
270.79 and the doctrine of after-acquired property. To place D
second in priority merely because B had mortgaged A's property
placed a secured debtor of a non-owner ahead of a judgment credi-
tor of the record owner. This would reduce any value in the record-
ing acts, for why should D have checked the records under B when
A was the debtor and owner?
Finally, the principle the United States Supreme Court enunci-
ated, stating that an equitable mortgagee is not a bona fide pur-
chaser for value but takes the property subject to all liens and
incumbrances that are docketed prior to the mortgagor actually
owning it, places all claims against the owner upon the property
until he finally deeds it away. Therefore, as long as a person has
not mortgaged his own property, that property is subject to the
claims of creditors and it would not depend upon a mortgage
executed by someone who does not own the property.
The apparent dichotomy of principles can be resolved by recog-
nizing what the court did here without making the fact apparent
on the record. The court pierced the corporate veil, it treated A,
the president, and B, the corporation, as one person. According to
the court, when A entered into the mortgage as president of the
corporation, he then also bound himself in his personal capacity.
1972]
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The court did not recognize the difference between the president
and fiduciary of a corporation and a person acting as a private
owner. However, without expressly saying so, the reasoning of the
decision is not bottomed on sound principles and is open to serious
debate.
In the alternative, the court may not have pierced the corporate
veil, but developed its own position in this type of creditor's prior-
ity situation. It would hold that an equitable mortgagee, because
of value given for a security interest, would stand ahead of a mere
judgment creditor who dockets in the interim.
In conclusion, the most tenable solution would be to assume
that on these particular facts, when a president and sole share-
holder owns real property individually and his corporation mort-
gages it, he will be held to have joined in the mortgage and to have
mortgaged his own property.
DAVID S. NORMAN
Securities: Corporation's Recapture of Insider's Short-Swing Prof-
its-Technical areas of the law can be fascinating. A person
unskilled in a complex field, such as securities regulation, has diffi-
culty appreciating the subtlety of the issues buried in the language
of a court's opinion. Even the corporate planner often overlooks
any esoteric quality amid his contriving to avoid expensive pitfalls
for clients. Of particular interest are the problems which have
plagued the application of the deceptively simple insider-trader
provision, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
In the nearly forty years of the statute's existence, the United
States Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari to every
case which turned on a construction of the section. Reliance Elec-
tric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.2 for the first time attempts to set
I. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) hereinafter cited as 16(b).
2. 404 U.S. 418 (1972). The only other 16(b) case which reached the United States
Supreme Court did not involve a construction of the terms "purchase and sale," but rather
involved the liability of a partner-director. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). There had
been confusion in the lower federal courts as to what policies were to guide the applicability
of the statute. Reliance, for the first time, attempts to define what types of transactions are
"purchases" and "sales" covered by 16(b). The statute has been a fruitful source of litiga-
tion, mainly because, although the plaintiff himself recovers nothing directly (the profit
recaptured inures to the issuing corporation), the courts have liberally awarded attorney's
fees, usually in the form of a percentage of the total recovery. For example, in Blau v. Brown
and Western Nuclear, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,263
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